ABSTRACT Motivated by complementing the ubiquitous sensor networks and cloud computing technique, a lot of attentions have been drawn to Sensor-Cloud (SC). The idea of SC thrives on the principle of virtualization of physical sensor nodes and has introduced the intermediate processing between physical sensor nodes and end users. This paper proposes an efficient interactive SC control scheme to provide on-demand sensing services for multiple applications. By adopting the game theory, we develop a new two-stage game model, which consists of a judicious mixture of selection and incentive algorithms. In our game model, a user can choose the most adaptable data center to execute its task, and each data center can give appropriate incentives to the participating sensors. The main merit possessed by our two-stage game approach is to shed light on the practical SC control problem while providing excellent adaptability and flexibility to satisfy the different application requirements. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to include a novel incentive algorithm in the SC system. Simulation results demonstrate that our approach can outperform existing schemes by about 5%∼15% in terms of the normalized user profit, service delay, and SC system throughput. Finally, we discuss future directions for designing SC control frameworks including other issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid advances in sensor electronics, digital communications, and miniaturization manufacturing technologies, small-sized smart sensing devices have become possible. The emergence of smart sensor devices has enhanced the standard of living of mankind with the touch of advanced 5G technology. In numerous real-life applications such as target tracking, battlefield monitoring, tele-monitoring, ubiquitous monitoring and several other applications, sensor devices are used to collect data in a self-governing manner. In the future, smart devices are connected to the global Internet based on the concept of Internet of Everything (IoE). Recent advancement in communication systems as well as all-connected sensing devices has the potential to significantly improve the human life standard [1] , [2] .
In parallel with the development of smart sensing technology, Cloud Computing (CC) has been implemented rapidly and becomes very common. Usually, cloud is used in science to describe a large agglomeration of objects that visually appear from a distance. In the information and communications technology field, it is a kind of Internet-based computing paradigm. This paradigm represents a distributing computing model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources. Therefore, the CC technology can provide flexible and scalable services by integrating the smart sensing devices [3] - [6] .
Nowadays, Sensor-Cloud (SC) is receiving a growing attention from both the academic and industrial communities. SC is motivated by incorporating the data sensing ability of wireless sensor networks into the powerful data storage and data processing capabilities of CC. Usually, traditional sensor networks are single-user centric, in which a user organization owns and deploys its personalized sensor network. Typically, this network does not share the accessed data to other user organizations. Without security centric applications, it is obvious that sensed data sharing is more profitable. One of main objectives of the SC is to enable a single sensor network to be able to produce sensing services for multiple applications at the same time. Therefore, the SC has been conceived as a potential solution for multi-organization sensor deployment and data access mechanisms [2] , [7] .
According to MicroStrains, a SC is formally defined as follows [2] : SC is a unique sensor data storage, visualization and remote management platform that leverages powerful cloud computing technologies to provide excellent data scalability, rapid visualization, and user programmable analysis. Therefore, virtualization is the basic concept of SC. It allows the abstraction of physical smart sensing devices into logical units, enabling the efficient usage by multiple independent users. In this approach, multiple applications can be able to co-exist on the same virtualized sensor network while allowing the elimination of tight coupling between services and physical sensor network deployments [8] .
Although SC technology has been receiving attention, there are still many challenges to solve. In particular, the appropriate sensor management, service quality control and system efficiency maximization are critical issues. Even though current studies have investigated to develop SC control algorithms, there is currently no study designing an efficient integrated scheme to addressing all above issues in the SC system. In addition, a fine-grained interactive control procedure is necessary to provide high Quality of Service (QoS) to SC users [9] .
To design a novel interactive SC control scheme, we need a new control paradigm. Nowadays, interactive conrol procedures to satisfy conflicting objectives are often characterized using game theory. Currently, game theory is extensively used for the modelling and analysis of competition and cooperation situations between the rational agents. Being the control theory of multiple goal-driven agents, game theory can provide effective solutions for dealing with SC situations and questions. Motivated by this factor, we have adopted a game theoretic approach to develop a practical SC control scheme. In this way, we are able to ease the heavy computational burden of theoretically optimal centralized solutions [8] , [10] .
In this study, the basic concept of our scheme is to design a new two-stage game model while harnessing the synergies between competitive and cooperative interactions among SC agents. Upper level game addresses the data center selection algorithm for each user, and our lower level game handles the incentive algorithm for participating sensors. These algorithms are combined in the proposed SC control scheme that is able to adapt dynamically changing SC network environments. As game players, users, data centers and sensors chose their best strategies to maximize the profit in an entirely distributed fashion. This decision process is operated according to the step-by-step timed manner. Finally, our game model achieves greater and reciprocal advantages for all players while ensuring adaptability and flexibility to obtain the finest solution under the current SC system conditions. Based on the two-stage game approach, our proposed scheme mainly considers three control decision issues; i) how to make SC participants achieve the best outcome just by truthfully acting, ii) how to select a sensible strategy to maximize the payoff, and iii) how to design a computation mechanism with polynomial time complexity. To effectively address these issues, we focus on three design principles such as truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational feasibility.
A. RELATED WORK
There has been considerable research into the implementation of SC systems. Misra et al. [2] focused on the theoretical characterization of virtualization, and presented a mathematical formulation of SC. The process of mapping an application to its physical resources and the procedure for virtualization of the resources were also discussed. In addition, they suggested a paradigm shift of technology from traditional sensor networks to SC architecture while providing a detailed analysis based on the performance metrics such as fault tolerance, lifetime of a sensor node, and energy consumption. Finally, future work was provided about the design issues and standardization of communication protocols [2] .
Chatterjee et al. [11] proposed a dynamic and optimal pricing scheme for the SC infrastructure. The proposed scheme was consisted of two components; one part addressed the problem of pricing the physical sensor nodes subject to variable demand and utility of users, and their part mainly focused on the pricing incurred due to the virtualization of resources. This scheme took into account the end-users' satisfaction and their net utility as one of the factors to establish the optimality in the pricing. Therefore, the main objective was to maximize the expected individual profit made by the several registered sensor owners along with the profit [11] .
The paper [12] discussed the potential applications and recent work about SC and observed control issues regarding green SC. And then, a new multi-method data delivery scheme was introduced to solve two control issues -1) a large number of repeated data transmissions from the cloud to SC users exclusively increased the demand regarding the energy and resources as well as the bandwidth of SC, 2) substantial data delivery from the cloud to multiple SC users increased the requirement with respect to the energy and resources as well as the bandwidth of SC. This scheme strategically incorporated four kinds of delivery: i) delivery from cloud to SC users; ii) delivery from sensor network to SC users; iii) delivery from SC users to SC users; and iv) delivery from cloudlet to SC users. Finally, evaluation results showed that the proposed scheme could achieve lower delivery cost or less delivery time for SC users [12] .
In [13] , a new SC architecture, called Mils-Cloud, was proposed for the integration of military tri-services in a battlefield scenario. It was a hierarchical architecture of SC with users having different levels of priority. Usually, sensor networks are widely used in the military domain, and their integration with CC enhanced their utilization. VOLUME 6, 2018 Therefore, a SC-based system is best suited for the specific military objectives. Finally, considering the dynamic nature of military operations and associated decision making processes, adaptive learning mechanisms were incorporated into the proposed system. The results showed that the performance was improved for priority users without compromising the availability for normal users [13] .
The study in [14] proposed a solution to the optimal gateway selection problem in the SC system. In particular, the gateway selection problem was modelled as a delay optimization problem in the SC architecture. Authors considered request priorities for gateway selection, that is, all the high priority requests were serviced first, and showed how the user requests can be mapped to the optimal gateway through the SC environment. Finally, they observed that their proposed scheme worked well for delay optimization. The future extension of this work was included how the requests could be serviced by the gateways more effectively in order to have a reliable, efficient and real-time monitoring system [14] .
T. Dinh et al proposed the Efficient Interactive Sensor Cloud (EISC) scheme to provide on-demand periodic sensing services to multiple applications which may have different latency requirements [1] . In the EISC scheme, a request aggregator was designed on the SC to aggregate applications' latency requests so that workloads required for physical sensors could be minimized to save energy. In particular, the aggregator enabled a sensor to run only a single task and scheduled while serving multiple applications with different requirements. The EISC scheme automatically adjusted the scheduling of sensors to meet the latency requirements of all applications. To control packet latency of sensing flows, a QoS controller located on the SC was designed to control end-to-end packet latency of sensing flows. Finally, analysis and experimental results showed that the EISC scheme effectively controled the latency of sensing flows with low signaling overhead and high energy efficiency [1] .
E. Rachkidi et al proposed the Resources Optimization and Efficient Distribution (ROED) scheme to share real and virtual sensors between different applications based on their requirements [15] . To minimize the burden on physical and logical sensors, the ROED scheme attempted to minimize the number of instantiated virtual sensors in the SC, as well the traffic to and from the physical and logical sensors while achieving the QoS objectives of applications. Therefore, physical, logical, and virtual sensors were shared across applications if it possible. This scheme formulated the optimization problem to achieve the best distribution of virtual sensors and machines in the SC infrastructure. The simulation results showed that the ROED scheme could minimize the deployment cost, as well as the data transit delay within the SC infrastructure [15] .
Some earlier studies [1] , [2] , [11] - [15] have attracted considerable attention while introducing unique challenges in handling the SC control problems. In this paper, we demonstrate that our proposed scheme significantly outperforms these existing EISC [1] and ROED [15] schemes.
These schemes also considered the SC platform with the concept of sensor virtualization and QoS provisioning. Therefore, like as our approach, they had developed control mechanisms based on the inter-relationship among different system agents.
B. CONTRIBUTION
Our work focuses on a dynamic controlling of SC and finding an effective solution, which is a well-balanced performance among conflicting requirements. To analyze the interactions among users, data centers and sensors, we design a new twostage game model. At the upper level game process, users and data centers are game players, and users select the most adaptable data center to complete their tasks. While selecting the data center, the QoS of the application is also taken into account. At the lower level game process, each data center and set of geographically scattered physical sensors are game players, and their interactions are modelled as an incentive algorithm. Using our two-stage game approach, a fair-balanced solution can be obtained under diversified SC network situations. In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Two-stage game model: we introduce a new game model while capturing dynamic SC interactions depending widely different and diversified system situations. This approach is generic and applicable to implement a real-world SC control scheme.
• Data center selection algorithm: as an upper level game, we design a data center selection algorithm to complete requested tasks. Considering the QoS requirement, users select the most adaptable data center to maximize their payoffs.
• Incentive algorithm for sensors: as a lower level game, we implement an incentive mechanism based on the three characteristics such as truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational feasibility.
• The synergy of combined algorithms: we explore the sequential interaction of data center selection and incentive distribution algorithms, and jointly design an integrated scheme to approximate an optimal SC performance. The synergy effect lies in its responsiveness to the reciprocal combination of different control algorithms.
• Performance analysis: Numerical study shows that our two-stage game approach can improve the normalized user profit, service delay and SC system throughput by 5% to 15% under different service request rates, comparing to the existing EISC [1] and ROED [15] schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents the addressing problem, the formation of our game model, and the work done so far on the proposed scheme. Particularly, selection algorithm and incentive algorithm are explained in detail. In addition, this section highlights the main steps of the proposed scheme.
In Section III, we provide our simulation scenario and discuss the experimental results while comparing with some existing methods. Finally, Section IV concludes the work. In this section, we also discuss the remaining open challenges in this research area along with possible solutions.
II. THE PROPOSED INTEGRATED SC CONTROL SCHEME A. TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL FOR THE SC SYSTEM
In this study, we consider that the SC infrastructure is a new dimension of cloud based sensor-management platform, which is functioning as an interface between the physical and cyber space. There are multiple user applications requesting for various types of sensor data from different regions. Therefore, each user individually submits his service request including seeking data, i.e., temperature, humidity, GPS, wind speed, etc., and the target region to its corresponding Data Center (DC). To effectively response applications' requests, the SC system renders Sensors-as-a-Service (Se-aaS) to the end-users by sharing the pool of sensors and cloud resources [15] . The scenario we assuming in this work consists of a set of user applications, multiple DCs and Physical Sensors (PSs) for data collections. PSs are located in different geographical locations, and they are grouped logically as a temporal set to meet the request of target application [11] , [15] . The SC system virtualizes PSs and maps them into Virtual Sensors (VSs) which are instances that abstract the functionalities of physical and logical data sources. Usually, VSs may be formed across multiple overlapping regions and serve as proxies between the data sources and Se-aaS of each user's applications. In the SC infrastructure, several Data Centers (DCs) are geographically distributed as service providers. Residing inside each DC, Virtual Machines (VMs) are generated to manage multiple VSs depending on their allocated resources. Originating from different regions, VSs' servings of particular user applications are stored, and processed within the dedicated VM, which is responsible to form instantaneously a Se-aaS [11] , [15] . In this study, our major goal is to design and propose a control scheme for the dynamic SC system that would serve particular user applications with requesting data types from the respective VSs. The main entities of our scheme are defined as follows;
Physical Sensors (PSs): to form a physical wireless sensor network, each PS has its own attributes, i.e., ID and type where S is the set of PSs, i.e., SN i ∈ S = {SN 1 . . . SN n } and I is the set of sensor types, i.e., τ j ∈ I = {τ 1 . . . τ m }; each SN has its own τ . Virtual Sensors (VSs): VS is a software emulation of PS, and inherits all attributes from the corresponding PS. V is the set of VSs where ∈ I) , region of interest and QoS requirement. Therefore, A contacts the same type (τ ) sensors. The SC has been a compelling paradigm; a user who requests his application task to its corresponding DC, needs to pay the price for the acting DC, and this DC rewards the participating PSs with incentive. The DC generates a VM to acquire SC services while procuring the information from the VSs to complete that task. Each VS is mapped to a corresponding PS, which is a selfish agent and needs to bear cost in providing its service. To select the most adaptable DC for the task accomplishment, it is natural to consider the user's payment, and how to design an incentive algorithm for the VS's service provisioning. The general architecture of a SC system platform is shown in Figure 1 . In this study, we develop a new two-stage game model (G) assuming dynamic SC situations. Formally, we define the G = {G upper , G lower VM A ∈W } where G upper is the upper level game to formulate interactions among users and DCs to decide the corresponding DC, and G lower VM A ∈W is the lower level game to formulate interactions among the DC and its corresponding VSs to reward VSs' incentives. During the G game operations, G upper and multiple G lower VM A ∈W are executed sequentially and repeatedly. These two-step iterations work together in a coordinated manner, and each application task is completed in an entirely distributed fashion. Table 1 lists the notations used in this paper. 
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where ξ A v is a coefficient to assign service cost distributions between the CC and the user-DC communication. k . Therefore, A v and A s re-negotiate with each other based on the new proposing P A v . To prevent infinite negotiation rounds, negotiation process must have completed within a negotiation constraint. Our G upper game process must have completed within a round constraint such as the cardinality of S A v . Therefore, less than the number of S A v negotiation rounds, the A v and a specific A finally reach an agreement or not.
C. LOWER LEVEL GAME MODEL FOR THE SC INCENTIVE ALGORITHM
According to the result of G upper game, the G lower VM game is triggered. In the selected DC, one VM is generating for the assigned task, and this VM distributes incentives to encourage VSs to participate SC services. For example, to complete the application task A v , the selected DC generate the VM A v , which consists of VSs, i.e., V i ∈ V VM Av . Sensors are geographically distributed in a local area, and the VM allocates the sensing work to each V and pays the incentive ϒ VM Av V . In the G lower VM game, we employ a truthful incentive algorithm, which is able to ensure the properties including individual rationality and truthfulness of participation.
To design the SC incentive algorithm, our lower level game is defined as • The T is a time period. The G lower
VM Av
is repeated H t ∈ T < ∞ time periods with imperfect information.
In our lower game process, assume that the VM A v includes multiple VSs, i.e., V to contribute its effort in the sensing process. To stimulate each V VM Av 's truthful participation, our incentive algorithm is formulated as follows. Each sensor is allowed to report its private cost information to perform the assigned sensing task. In order to increase its payoff, each sensor may untruthfully report its cost information to the corresponding VM [16] . Let δ 
Based on the real contribution of V
VM Av j
, we need to design an incentive algorithm satisfying the following desirable properties: i) truthfulness, ii) individual rationality, and iii) computational feasibility [16] . ii) individual rationality: the payoff of V VM Av j is non-
iii) computational feasibility: the reward R (·) should be computed in polynomial time. To design a truthful incentive algorithm, we first present a payment mechanism determining how much to pay an incentive reward for the V . F (·) is inspired by the recent work devoted to the contribution maximization problem with limited budget while determining the payment as little as possible to meet the target contribution [16] - [18] .
If e − δ
does not contribute any effort. According to the Myerson's characterization, R (·) function maps the cost for a sensing task into a payment for the service provisioning [16] , [17] .
D. MAIN STEPS OF THE PROPOSED SC CONTROL ALGORITHMS
In this study, the prime focus is to combine the DC selection algorithm and the incentive computation algorithm comprehensively to get full synergy of dynamic SC system operations. However, designing a proper combination of these two algorithms is a particularly challenging problem. Inspired by this, our aim is to offer an integrated SC control scheme based on a novel two-stage game model, which is implemented as a distributed and dynamic repeated game. Our game approach plays a crucial role to provide a suitable tradeoff between the different goals of users, DCs and PSs. Through a step-bystep interactive game process, individual game players can capture the current SC system condition and determine their best strategies to maximize their payoffs; it is a promising approach to implement the real world decision making process. The main steps of the proposed SC control scheme are described as follows.
Step 1: At the initial time, application features and system parameters are determined by the simulation scenario and Table 2 .
Step 2: At the upper-level game process, a user independently requests A with τ while offering P A . Each A generates a VM and calculate the A (A) to complete the task A based on the equation (1).
Step 3: If A (A) < P A , the A estimates the P A VM A . By considering three delay factors, it is obtained according to (2) .
Step 4: The user selects the best A to complete the task A.
By using the (4), the A with the minimum P A VM A is chosen while P A VM A ≤ ∂ A and A (A) < P A .
Step 5: The lower-level game is triggered according to the result of the upper-level game. In the selected A, the VM announces the sensing task to the V VM A and procures the services from the participating sensors.
Step 6: To pay a truthful incentive, we calculate a reward R (·) for each V VM A based on the equation (6).
According to the Myerson's characterization, it can satisfy the desirable incentive properties.
Step 7: Based on the step-by-step interactive game process, users, DCs and sensors attempt to maximize their payoffs by selecting their best strategies, and cause a cascade of interactions in an online distributed fashion.
Step 8: Under the dynamic SC system environment, individual users are constantly requesting applications for the next two-stage game process; go to Step 2.
III. PERFORMANMCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed protocol, and compare it with that of the existing EISC [1] and ROED [15] schemes. Based on the simulation results, we confirm the superiority of the proposed approach. To ensure a fair comparison, the following simulation assumptions and system scenario are used.
• 1000 physical sensors are used in which the sensors are distributed randomly in a region of size 10,000 m × 10,000 m.
• Each sensor and application type is randomly decided among {τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , τ 4 }.
• The simulated system consists of 100 users, and the 10 DCs. They are geographically distributed.
• Each DC's front-haul link capacity (T) is 100 Gbps, and cloud computation capacity (C) is 50 GHz.
• The service price strategies in S A v are defined as P • According to each user's characteristics, application tasks are generated based on the Poisson process, which is with rate λ (services/s), and the range is varied from 0 to 3.
• There are 4 different application requests, which are specified according to the connection duration, CC and bandwidth requirements, and sensing cycles per second. They are generated with equal probability.
• All applications need the full region coverage information.
• System performance measures obtained on the basis of 100 simulation runs are plotted as functions of the application service request generation rate.
• For simplicity, we assume the absence of physical obstacles in the experiments. To demonstrate the validity of our proposed method, we measured the normalized user profit, service delay and SC system throughput. Table 2 shows the system parameters used in the simulation. Major system control parameters of the simulation, presented in Table 2 , facilitate the development and implementation of our simulator. Figure 2 gives the performance comparison of each scheme in terms of the normalized user profit. In this simulation study, the user profit is measured as the ratio of paid price to each application task. From this figure, we can see that all schemes exhibit a similar trend. However, the proposed scheme selects the most adaptable DC through the interactive negotiation process and completes the requested task to meet its preferences. Therefore, users and SC system can reach jointly a mutually acceptable agreement within the constraint round of negotiation. It leads to higher user profit, and provides an ideal solution characterized by SC system environments. Therefore, the proposed scheme outperforms the existing methods from low to high service request load distributions. Figure 3 presents the normalized service delay for each scheme. From the viewpoint of QoS, service delay is an important performance criterion. It is intuitively correct to see that the service delay slowly increases under the heavy service request situations. In the simulation result, we have supposed that our decision criteria to select the DC plays an important role to reduce the service latency. Among various QoS constraints, we especially focus on the delay issue and attempt to minimize the service delay. For this reason, the proposed scheme can attain the lower service latency delay to other schemes. In addition, it is also interesting to see that VOLUME 6, 2018 we consistently maintain the operational excellence from low to high service load intensities. The curves in Figure 4 indicate the normalized throughput of SC system. From the viewpoint of system operator, throughput maximization is a main concern. The curves in Fig. 4 indicate that our scheme improves the system throughput performance more significantly than the existing schemes. According to our interactive two-stage game model, SC system agents individually recognize the current SC system environment, and effectively decide control decisions to improve their payoffs. In particular, the VM in selected DC distributes incentives to encourage VSs to participate SC services. Therefore, many VSs actively perform the SC services, and successfully complete application tasks; it leads a higher system throughput.
In summary, simulation results shown in Figures 2 to 4 demonstrate that the proposed scheme, which uses a novel two-stage game model, can monitor the current SC system conditions and leverages the DC selection and the incentive algorithm to get the full synergy of SC system operation. Through ongoing game theoretic operations and functionality, users, DC and sensors make intelligent control decisions in a self-adapting manner to maximize their payoffs. Therefore, game players can avoid the inevitable burden of uncertainty while achieving the improved system performance. From the viewpoint of practical operations, it is a suitable approach for real world SC system management.
In conclusion, simulation results show that our scheme attains an attractive SC system performance, something that the EISC [1] and ROED [15] schemes cannot offer.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Recently, sensor networks and cloud computing integration has been receiving a great interest among researchers. To make networked connections more relevant and valuable, SC technology enables sharing the pool of sensors and cloud resources to complete various applications. In this article, we have proposed an integrated SC control scheme by combining the DC selection and incentive algorithms.
In particular, we formulate the SC control problem as a new two-stage game process that models the relations among users, DCs and sensors to successfully complete application tasks. Using the step-by-step interactive game process, we explore effective answers to the fundamental questions of how to complete tasks with the best price and how to design an incentive algorithm while ensuring desirable properties. By capturing the tradeoff between cooperative and noncooperative propensities, all SC agents in our scheme interact sequentially with each other, and select their best strategies to maximize their expected benefits. Compared to the state-ofthe-art protocol, simulation results are presented to show the superiority of our integrated scheme. Further, our two-stage game approach will be an interesting topic for future work. New research issues will focus on algorithm designs for optimization of SC resource utilization. In addition, dynamic VM migration methods can be proposed to ensure localized load sharing and balancing among the DCs. By current research, security issue still lacks exploration. Therefore, another interesting direction is to address the network security issues in the SC system from the operator's perspective.
